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NOT YOUR DUMPING GROUND: CRIMINALIZATION 
OF TRAFFICKING IN HAZARDOUS WASTE IN AFRICA 
MATIANGAI V.S. SIRLEAF* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines how the African Union’s adoption of the 
Malabo Protocol seeks to improve upon the limitations of the international 
legal framework for regulating hazardous waste. The Malabo Protocol 
criminalizes trafficking in hazardous waste and envisions a regional forum 
for such prosecutions, which presents an opportunity for African states to 
alter the status quo in environmental protection. This Article examines 
how the troubling history of toxic colonialism in Africa helped to inform 
the attempt to criminalize the trafficking of hazardous waste and create a 
forum under the Malabo Protocol for combatting dirty dumping.  
This Article explores how the inadequate international legal 
framework for regulating hazardous waste, led to the attempt to create a 
more robust regional regime under the Bamako Convention, with the 
Malabo Protocol serving as the vehicle for regional enforcement. It 
evaluates whether the Protocol furthers the punitive objectives of the 
Bamako regime to punish and deter trafficking in hazardous waste. It does 
this by analyzing whether the regional prosecution of dirty dumping is 
consistent with the newer theories of punishment, as well as some of the 
more traditional goals of punishment.  
This Article also analyzes the implications of the regional 
prosecution of dirty dumping under the Malabo Protocol. It assesses the 
potential challenges that might arise in the attempt to regionally prosecute 
trafficking in hazardous waste and suggests ways these issues can be 
resolved through creative interpretation of the Malabo Protocol. Lastly, 
this Article concludes that the Malabo Protocol’s provision for a regional 
forum for the prosecutions of traffickers of hazardous waste presents 
another venue for African states whose domestic judiciaries and related 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. I would like to thank Ifeoma
Ajunwa, Rabia Belt, Kamari Clarke and the participants in the University of Pittsburgh School of
Law’s Junior Faculty Emerging Ideas workshop for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. I
would also like to thank Jacqueline Jones for her research assistance. I take full responsibility for 
any errors.
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3161739 
SIRLEAF_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2018  1:06 PM 
Vol. 35, No. 2 Not Your Dumping Ground 327 
 
institutions may have limited resources. If implemented, the Protocol could 
facilitate closing the global impunity gap for dirty dumping in Africa. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“We talk of globalization, of the global village, but here in Africa we are 
under the impression of being that village’s septic tank.” 
- Haïdar el Ali, Senegalese Minister of Ecology1 
 
The African Union (AU) adopted the Malabo Protocol, which 
would create the first-ever regional criminal tribunal, if it attains sufficient 
ratifications.2 The Protocol requires 15 ratifications before it can come into 
force; at the time of writing eleven states have signed it.3 The Protocol 
criminalizes trafficking in hazardous waste4 and presents an opportunity 
for African states to alter the status quo in environmental protection. No 
existing international criminal tribunals have jurisdiction over trafficking 
in hazardous waste.5 African states may be particularly sensitive to 
concerns about toxic waste, given a history of negative external 
interventions.6 This article argues that regional cooperation through the 
                                                     
 1 Christopher Parayre, Africa: The world’s ‘septic tank’, MAIL & GUARDIAN (Sept. 25, 2006), 
https://mg.co.za/article/2006-09-25-africa-the-worlds-septic-tank. 
 2 Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights, art. 16, May 15-16, 2014, A.U. Doc. No. STC/Legal/Min/7(I) Rev.1 [hereinafter 
Malabo Protocol]. The Assembly of the AU adopted the Malabo Protocol on June 30, 2014 at its 
Twenty-Third Ordinary Session. See Decision on the Draft Legal Instruments, A.U. Doc. No. 
Assembly/AU/Dec.529 (XXIII) (entered into force June 30, 2014). The regional criminal court 
would be composed of a Pre-Trial Chamber, a Trial Chamber, and an Appellate Chamber. Malabo 
Protocol, supra note 2, art. 16(1); see also DINAH L. SHELTON & PAOLO G. CARROZA, REGIONAL 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1019 (ed. 2013) (characterizing this as “revolutionary”). 
 3 See Parties to the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights, AFR. UNION, http://www.au.int/en/treaties/protocol-amendments-
protocol-statute-african-court-justice-and-human-rights (last visited Mar. 22, 2018) [hereinafter 
Parties to the Malabo Protocol]. 
 4 Malabo Protocol, supra note 2, art. 28L. 
 5 See generally Agreement for and Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N.-Sierra Leone, 
Jan. 16, 2002, http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uClnd1MJeEw%3d&tabid=176 
[hereinafter SCSL Statute]; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc 
S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000) (on the establishment of the SCSL); Statute International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/English/Legal/Statute/2010.pdf [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; 
Statute International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993), 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf [hereinafter ICTY 
Statute]. 
 6 For further discussion, see Henry J. Richardson, African Grievances and the International 
Criminal Court: Issues of African Equity Under International Criminal Law, in AFRICA AND THE 
FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 81, 88–89 (Vincent O. Nmehielle ed., 2012) 
(discussing the continent’s history with slavery, colonialism, and neo-colonialism). 
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criminal tribunal might assist with more effective prosecution of toxic 
dumping incidents. This is especially so because the Protocol provides for 
corporate criminal liability,7 which presents a significant innovation for 
the field of international criminal justice.8 
This article examines how the AU’s adoption of the Malabo 
Protocol seeks to improve upon the limitations of the international legal 
framework for regulating hazardous waste. Little to no scholarship exists 
on the Malabo Protocol’s provision criminalizing trafficking in hazardous 
waste. This article illuminates an under-researched area and provides a 
robust analysis of the criminalization of trafficking in hazardous waste in 
Africa. This article situates the Malabo Protocol’s provision criminalizing 
the trafficking in hazardous waste as part of the larger environmental 
justice movement and the struggle against corporate, government, and 
individual polluters. 
Environmental justice as a field is primarily concerned with 
inequitable distribution, the lack of recognition, limited participation, the 
critical lack of capabilities, the inequitable application of environmental 
regulations, and the systematic exclusion from environmental policies and 
decisions amongst others.9 Robert Nixon coined the term “slow violence” 
to describe a violence of delayed destruction that is “dispersed throughout 
time and space” to disposable bodies.10 His work draws attention to 
categories of violence that unfolds over years and decades, is often 
exponential, and operates as a major threat multiplier, in the same way that 
toxic dumping can.11 Such work complicates our understanding of 
violence because it does not conceive of violence as spectacular, 
                                                     
 7 Malabo Protocol, supra note 2, art. 46C. This article relies on the broad definition of “hazardous 
waste” in the Bamako Convention, including wastes from particular streams in manufacturing 
processes, or hazardous constituent materials, wastes considered hazardous under the domestic 
laws of the country of export, import, or transit, as well as wastes outlawed in the exporting country 
due to human health or environmental reasons, and radioactive wastes. See Bamako Convention 
on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and 
Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, art. 2, Annex I, Annex II, Jan. 29, 1991, (entered 
into force Apr. 22, 1998) [hereinafter Bamako Convention]. 
 8 None of the existing international criminal tribunals provide for corporate criminal liability. See 
SCSL Statute, supra note 5; Rome Statute, supra note 5; ICTR Statute, supra note 5; ICTY Statute, 
supra note 5. 
 9 See Workineh Kelbessa, Environmental Injustice in Africa, 9 CONTEMP. PRAGMATISM 99, 105 
(2012). 
 10 ROB NIXON, SLOW VIOLENCE AND THE ENVIRONMENTALISM OF THE POOR 2 (Harvard Univ. Press 
rev. ed. 2011) (discussing the analogous concept of slow violence). 
 11 Id. at 3. 
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immediately sensational, or hyper-visible.12 The concept of slow violence 
allows us to consider more forcefully the violence caused by 
environmental harms like toxic dumping. 
The dumping of toxic waste in the Global South, and particularly 
in African countries is by no means an exceptional or recent 
phenomenon.13 This article will demonstrate the problematic trend of 
“toxic colonialism,” in which African states are used as “disposal sites for 
waste rejected” by more developed states.14 The term “colonialism” is used 
to signify the relationship between countries in the Global North (more 
industrial developed countries in the Northern Hemisphere) that export the 
risks of toxic waste to countries in the Global South (less developed 
countries that generally make up the Southern Hemisphere) who do not 
“share in the benefits of the production process that generates those 
wastes.”15 This pattern resembles some of the characteristics of historical 
colonialism in that toxic colonialism is similarly driven by economic 
dependence, exploitation, and inequality.16 
As I argued elsewhere, the regional criminal court proposed in the 
Malabo Protocol can be understood as part of an emerging regime complex 
in the field of international criminal law.17 Regime complexes consist of 
“several legal agreements that are created and maintained in distinct fora 
with participation of different sets of actors.”18 They allow for greater 
creativity and flexibility. This adaptability is evident in the types of crimes 
covered by the regional criminal court, especially the attempt to regulate 
the trafficking in hazardous waste. 
Part I of this article provides a brief background on how the 
history of toxic colonialism in Africa helped to inform the attempt to 
criminalize the trafficking of hazardous waste in the Malabo Protocol. Part 
                                                     
 12 Id. at 13. 
 13 See Rob White, Toxic Cities: Globalizing the Problem of Waste, 35 SOCIAL JUST. 107 (2008). 
 14 Laura A. W. Pratt, Decreasing Dirty Dumping? A Reevaluation of Toxic Waste Colonialism and 
the Global Management of Transboundary Hazardous Waste, 41 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 147, 151 
(2011) (discussing how the term “toxic colonialism” was coined by Greenpeace to describe the 
dumping of “industrial wastes of the West on territories of the Third World”). 
 15 See, e.g., Samuel O. Atteh, Political Economy of Environmental Degradation: The Dumping of 
Toxic Waste in Africa, 30 INT’L STUD. 277, 278 (1993) (discussing the unfairness of this 
relationship). 
 16 See Pratt, supra note 14, at 151–52. 
 17 Matiangai V.S. Sirleaf, Regionalism, Regime Complexes and the Crisis in International Criminal 
Justice, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 699, 699 (2016). 
 18 Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources, 58 INT’L 
ORG. 277, 279 (2004). 
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II explores how the inadequate international legal framework for 
regulating hazardous waste led to the criminalization of trafficking in 
hazardous waste in Africa and the provision for a regional forum for 
prosecution through the Malabo Protocol. Part III analyzes how the 
regional prosecution of trafficking in hazardous waste contributes towards 
some of the newer theories of punishment, as well as some of the more 
traditional goals of punishment. Part III also discusses how any potential 
implementation challenges might be resolved through creative 
interpretation of the Protocol. Lastly, this article concludes that the 
regional criminal court’s prosecution of trafficking in hazardous waste 
presents another possibility for African states whose domestic judiciaries 
and related institutions may not be able to prosecute this offense, 
especially given that the international system has failed to prosecute 
trafficking in hazardous waste or corporations involved in toxic dumping. 
I. OVERVIEW OF TOXIC COLONIALISM IN AFRICA 
The toxic dumping discussed in this part illustrates the disturbing 
pattern of colonialism, marked by economic dependence, exploitation, and 
inequality. 
A. THE GLOBAL INCREASE & CAUSES OF TRAFFICKING IN 
HAZARDOUS WASTE 
In 2000, worldwide generation of hazardous waste was 400 
million metric tons, with almost all of this amount originating in developed 
nations.19 It is estimated that by 2020, the total production of hazardous 
waste in the Global North will have increased by 60% annually.20 Most of 
the estimates of the transboundary movement of hazardous waste from the 
Global North to the Global South are quite small.21 However, all of the 
estimates are based on the legal transfer of hazardous waste since “illegal 
                                                     
 19 See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 947 (3d ed. 
2007). 
 20 See, e.g., DAVID NAGUIB PELLOW, RESISTING GLOBAL TOXICS: TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENTS 
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 33 (Robert Gottleib ed., 2007). 
 21 See, e.g., HUNTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 947 (estimating that only 4% of the generated 
hazardous waste actually travels across borders). 
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transboundary exchanges of hazardous waste [are] much more difficult” 
to quantify.22 
Irrespective of the exact amount of hazardous waste, toxic 
dumping in Africa is a significant problem for several reasons. People that 
are exposed to toxic waste can experience dire health consequences 
including respiratory problems, birth defects, burns, miscarriages, nausea, 
severe headaches, paralysis, frequent illness, irritation of the eyes and skin, 
various types of cancer, brain damage, intestinal disease, stunted growth, 
harm to the immune system, pathological conditions, and death.23 If not 
properly treated, toxic waste can not only threaten human life, but can also 
lead to ecological, geological, and environmental disasters. For example, 
contaminated soil, groundwater, and streams can endanger public health 
and the environment.24 A significant percentage of Africans live in rural 
areas that are dependent on groundwater and streams for domestic and 
agricultural uses.25 The disposal of hazardous waste in landfills can easily 
result in water and food contamination.26 The lack of the necessary 
infrastructure, facilities, environmental technology, and economic 
resources means that toxic dumping on the continent has much more 
devastating consequences than it does elsewhere.27 
Given these negative consequences, why does toxic colonialism 
persist? The key driver is profit.28 Toxic colonialism is also furthered by 
certain structural changes of and in the global system, including the 
“restructuring of the nation-state and the growth of interdependence.”29 
The age of globalization30 is marked by the increased mobility of capital 
and competition amongst states to attract foreign direct investment. For 
example, the amount of money offered for permission to import hazardous 
waste into African countries is sometimes more than the individual 
                                                     
 22 Pratt, supra note 14, at 153. 
 23 See Kelbessa, supra note 9, at 109. 
 24 Atteh, supra note 15, at 279. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 See Pratt, supra note 14, at 154. 
 29 Anél Ferreira-Snyman, Regionalism and the Restructuring of the United Nations with Specific 
Reference to the African Union, 44 COMP. & INT’L L.J. S. AFR. 360, 362 (2011). 
 30 See Adam Lupel, Regionalism and Globalization: Post-Nation or Extended Nation? 36 POLITY 
153, 155 (2004). Globalization is a term that “summarizes a variety of processes that together 
increase the scale, speed, and effectiveness of social interactions across political, economic, 
cultural, and geographical borders.” Id. 
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country’s gross national product or its total foreign debt.31 Accordingly, 
individual developing countries are dissuaded from taking additional 
regulatory measures that would force multinational corporations (MNCs)32 
to comply with environmental and human rights obligations.33 For 
instance, in some African countries, there are “no real treatment 
process[es] and no proper storage”34 options for hazardous waste. Indeed, 
the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) noted that “it costs as 
little as $2.50 per ton to [legally] dump hazardous waste in Africa as 
opposed to $250 per ton in Europe.”35 Consequently, since the late 1970s, 
toxic waste has been exported increasingly to Africa.36 
B. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TOXIC COLONIALISM IN AFRICA 
Toxic colonialism manifests in many ways: from Western MNCs 
rarely having track records of safe waste disposal, to the receiving 
countries not being accurately informed about the dangers of the 
hazardous waste,37 to the lack of capacity of countries in the Global South 
to deal with the aftermath of dumping. In the mid-1980s, a number of 
African countries had private local companies, individuals, and 
governments openly or secretly sign waste disposal contracts with waste 
                                                     
 31 See David M. Dzidzornu, Marine Pollution Control in the West and Central African Region, 20 
QUEENS L.J. 439, 451 n.31 (1995). 
 32 Multinational corporations (MNCs) or transnational corporations (TNCs) “are economic entities 
operating in more than one country or a cluster of economic entities operating in two or more 
countries.” See Economic and Social Council Res., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 
26, 2003). 
 33 See Lupel, supra note 30, at 157 (discussing how globalization challenges states in their: 
administrative effectiveness, territorial sovereignty, collective identity, and democratic 
legitimacy). 
 34 Fred Bridgland, Europe’s New Dumping Ground: Fred Bridgland reports on how the West’s toxic 
waste is poisoning Africa, SUNDAY HERALD, (Oct. 1, 2006), 
http://archive.ban.org/ban_news/2006/061001_dumping_ground.html (quoting the French 
environmental group “Robin Hood of the Forest”). 
 35 UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAM, AFTER THE TSUNAMI: RAPID ENVIRONMENTAL 
ASSESSMENT 135 (2005), 
http://allafrica.com/download/resource/main/main/idatcs/00010390:6cf8736d0bf3cee680156082
14d00f53.pdf [hereinafter UNEP Report]. 
 36 See Atteh, supra note 15, at 281 (discussing how France and the U.S. export “enormous amounts 
of hazardous waste to Africa”). 
 37 See James Brooke, Waste Dumpers Turning to West Africa, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 1988) at A1, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/17/world/waste-dumpers-turning-to-west-
africa.html?pagewanted=all. 
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brokers.38 These contracts authorized waste brokers “to use certain 
designated areas” for dumping hazardous waste.39 For example, the 
governments of Benin and Guinea-Bissau signed lucrative contracts with 
companies in the Global North to dump hazardous waste in their territories 
for a specified period of time.40 In Benin, the company falsely described 
the hazardous waste material in the ten-year contract as “complex organic 
matter’” and “ordinary industrial wastes.”41 In Guinea, a Norwegian 
shipping company brokered a deal in 1988 to dump on Kassa, a resort 
island not too far from the capital.42 The company unloaded 15,000 tons 
of a substance listed as “raw material for bricks” in an abandoned quarry.43 
Subsequently, visitors from the mainland noticed that the island’s 
vegetation began to shrivel.44 A government investigation later discovered 
that in fact the material was incinerator ash from Philadelphia.45 Following 
the incident, the government of Guinea arrested at least thirteen people,46 
including the Norwegian Consul-General who was accused of forging an 
import license to enable the company to import the hazardous waste.47 
International furor ensued, and a Norwegian freighter completed removal 
of the hazardous waste in July of 1988.48 
This pattern of toxic colonialism is replicated in Somalia’s 
experience with hazardous waste dumping. In 1992, Italian and Swiss 
MNCs purportedly negotiated an $80 million, twenty-year contract with 
the “Minister of Health” to dump toxic waste.49 This is despite the reality 
that Somalia was embroiled in a devastating civil war with none of the 
                                                     
 38 See Kelbessa, supra note 9, at 109. 
 39 Atteh, supra note 15, at 281. 
 40 For further discussion see id. at 285–86. 
 41 Brooke, supra note 37. 
 42 See id. 
 43 See id. 
 44 See id. 
 45 See id.; see also Mark Jaffe, Tracking the Khian Sea: Port to Port, Deal to Deal, PHILA. INQUIRER 
(July 15, 1988), http://articles.philly.com/1988-07-15/news/26236354_1_khian-sea-coastal-
carriers-incinerator-ash (discussing how efforts to dispose of the Philadelphian ash failed in Chile, 
Honduras, Haiti, the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, and Costa Rica before it reached the West 
Coast of Africa). 
 46 See Barbara Huntoon, Emerging Controls on Transfers of Hazardous Waste to Developing 
Countries, 21 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 247, 250 (1989). 
 47 See Atteh, supra note 15, at 285. 
 48 See Brooke, supra note 41. 
 49 Hao-Nhien Q. Vu, The Law of Treaties and the Export of Hazardous Waste, 12 UCLA J. ENVT’L 
L. & POL’Y 389, 390 (1994). 
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warring factions able to claim any sense of legitimacy or hold on power. 
The dumping began in the early 1980s and continued throughout the civil 
war.50 The financial arrangements undoubtedly helped to fuel the conflict 
and gave powerful incentives to the various warlords to ignore 
environmental and public health repercussions.51 Italian authorities 
initiated an investigation into the company’s hazardous waste trade in 
1997.52 Due to the continued violence and political instability in Somalia, 
the prospects for a successful clean-up are limited. 
The dumping of toxic waste in Somalia gained renewed 
international attention following the 2004 tsunami.53 The waves from the 
tsunami exposed containers, which held “radioactive waste, lead, 
cadmium, mercury, flame retardants, hospital waste, and cocktails of other 
deadly residues,” on Somalia’s shores.54 “Subsequent cancer clusters have 
also been linked to Europe’s special gift to the country, delivered by that 
tsunami.”55 A report by UNEP found the release of the deadly substances 
caused health and environmental problems to the surrounding 
communities including contamination of groundwater.56 Moreover, many 
people subsequently complained of unusual health problems caused by the 
tsunami winds blowing the hazardous waste, including: acute respiratory 
infections, dry heavy coughing and mouth bleeding, abdominal 
hemorrhages, unusual skin chemical reactions, and sudden death after 
inhaling toxic materials.57 
Nigeria’s experience also exhibits the problematic pattern of 
countries in the Global North exporting the risks of toxic waste to 
countries in the Global South, who do not share in the benefits of the 
production process of the waste.58 In Nigeria, a businessman permitted two 
Italian MNCs to use his residential property to store 18,000 drums of 
                                                     
 50 See UNEP Report, supra note 35, at 134. 
 51 See Bridgland, supra note 34. 
 52 See Kelbessa, supra note 9, at 110. 
 53 Id. at 109. 
 54 Bridgland, supra note 34. 
 55 Id. 
 56 UNEP Report, supra note 35, at 134. 
 57 Id. 
 58 See, e.g., Sylvia F. Liu, The Koko Incident: Developing International Norms for the 
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, 8 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT’L. L. 121 (1992); 
Toxic Terrorism, WEST AFRICA, June 20, 1988, at 1108; Special correspondent, Nigeria: Koko’s 
Radioactive Waste, WEST AFRICA, Aug. 1, 1988, at 1388. 
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hazardous waste in 1987.59 His property was located in Koko, Nigeria, a 
small rural community located on the Niger River.60 The line ship, which 
was registered in Germany, was refused entry in Europe because the ship 
had been found to be carrying “highly poisonous chemical waste” before 
it made its way to Nigeria.61 The businessman charged $100 a month for 
the storage of the toxic waste.62 The ship delivered four shipments of the 
waste before media exposure of the crime alerted the Nigerian 
authorities.63 A Nigerian construction company falsified documents to the 
government, which allowed the company to import the toxic waste under 
the pretense that it was importing “building materials.”64 Nineteen 
individuals in the area died, including the businessman who stored the 
waste in his backyard, and others suffered adverse effects including 
chemical burns. 65 Moreover, due to exposure a member of the crew who 
reloaded the waste was paralyzed, while the dockworkers that repackaged 
the waste on board the ship reportedly vomited blood.66 Nigeria’s 
government responded forcefully—it recalled its ambassador to Italy, 
demanded that Italy remove the waste at once, and seized an Italian ship 
docked in its harbor.67 The government also enacted a decree making the 
trafficking in hazardous waste a capital crime, but later reduced the 
punishment to life imprisonment.68 It also passed a decree in 1988, which 
barred citizens from negotiating toxic waste contracts with foreign 
companies.69 
The patterns of economic dependence, exploitation, and 
inequality that characterized the Nigerian and Somalian toxic dumping 
incidents resurfaced more than twenty years later in Côte d’Ivoire. Outrage 
about toxic dumping in Nigeria in 1988, led Côte d’Ivoire to adopt a law 
                                                     
 59 See Kelbessa, supra note 9, at 109. 
 60 See Atteh, supra note 15, at 283. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See Kelbessa, supra note 9, at 109. 
 63 See Atteh, supra note 15, at 282–83. 
 64 Id. at 284. 
 65 See id. 
 66 Id.; see also Kelbessa, supra note 9, at 109. 
 67 See Atteh, supra note 15, at 283. 
 68 See Joel Millman, Exporting Hazardous Waste: From Developed to Third World Nations, TECH. 
REV., Apr. 1989, at 7; see also Kingsley Moghalu, Nigeria Gets Tough on Toxic Dumping, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 30, 1989, 
https://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/1989/0330/odump.html. 
 69 See Atteh, supra note 15, at 287. 
SIRLEAF_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2018  1:06 PM 
Vol. 35, No. 2 Not Your Dumping Ground 337 
 
that provides for prison terms of up to twenty years and fines of up to $1.6 
million for individuals who import hazardous waste.70 In August of 2006, 
a ship named the Probo Koala, which was chartered by the Dutch-based 
oil and service shipping company Trafigura Beheer BV, offloaded toxic 
waste.71 The Probo Koala left the waste at the port of Abidjan, the capital 
city of Côte d’Ivoire.72 A local contractor of Trafigua disposed of the waste 
at approximately eighteen open-air sites in and around the city of 
Abidjan.73 Similar to the hazardous dumping incident in Nigeria, the ship 
had attempted to discharge its waste in Europe, but was unable to due to 
the toxicity of the waste.74 People living near the discharge sites began to 
suffer from a range of illnesses: nausea, diarrhea, vomiting, 
breathlessness, headaches, skin damage, and swollen stomachs.75 The 
exposure to this waste caused the death of sixteen people, and more than 
100,000 people sought medical attention.76 Trafigura denied any 
wrongdoing.77 In early 2007, the company paid approximately $195 
million to the Ivorian government for cleanup.78 The government waived 
its right to prosecute the company.79 Today, more than ten years after the 
dumping of large quantities of toxic waste in Côte d’Ivoire, despite the 
huge numbers of people affected, international coverage of the issue, and 
several legal proceedings, there remains no effective national, regional, or 
international mechanism to prevent and address a similar disaster.80 
                                                     
 70 See Brooke, supra note 41, at 2. 
 71  See Amnesty International and Greenpeace, The Toxic Truth, AMNESTY INT’L 8, (Sept. 25, 2012), 
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/publications/toxics/ProboKoala/Th
e-Toxic-Truth.pdf [hereinafter The Toxic Truth]. 
 72 See id. at 9. 
 73 See Toxic waste dumping in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, ENVTL. JUSTICE ATLAS, 
http://ejatlas.org/conflict/toxic-waste-dumping-in-abidjan-ivory-coast (last visited Mar. 22, 2018). 
 74 See Trafigura Lawsuits (re Côte d’Ivoire), BUS. & HUMAN RIGHTS RES. CTR., http://business-
humanrights.org/en/trafigura-lawsuits-re-c%C3%B4te-d%E2%80%99ivoire (last visited Mar. 22, 
2018); see also Amnesty International and Greenpeace Call for Criminal Investigation, AMNESTY 
INT’L (Sept. 25, 2012), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2012/09/report-slams-failure-
prevent-toxic-waste-dumping-west-africa/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2018) [hereinafter Call for 
Criminal Investigation]. 
 75 See The Toxic Truth, supra note 71, at 57. 
 76 See id. at 2. 
 77 See id. at 60; see also Bianca Lazzari, The International Movement of Hazardous Waste: The Ivory 
Coast, PREZI, (May 28, 2014), https://prezi.com/nd1b96exyf1j/the-international-movement-of-
hazardous-waste-the-ivory-coa/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2018). 
 78 See The Toxic Truth, supra note 71, at 9. 
 79 See id. 
 80 For further discussion, see infra Part II. 
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According to a three-year investigative report by Amnesty 
International and Greenpeace, “too little has been done to strengthen 
national and international regulations, even after the scale of the toxic 
dumping became clear.”81 Greenpeace International Executive Director 
Kumi Naidoo said that 
[Trafigura is] a story of corporate crime, human rights abuse and 
governments’ failure to protect people and the environment. It is a 
story that exposes how systems for enforcing international law have 
failed to keep up with companies that operate transnationally, and how 
one company has been able to take full advantage of legal uncertainties 
and jurisdictional loopholes, with devastating consequences.82 
The victims of Trafigura’s toxic dumping in Côte d’Ivoire were 
not able to seek redress in their domestic judiciary. They also tried to seek 
justice in Europe, which ultimately proved unsatisfactory.83 
The incidents of toxic colonialism discussed above indicate that 
several countries attempted to take steps to limit toxic dumping in their 
territories by resorting to criminal sanctions.84 These countries also 
utilized tort law, but both areas of their domestic law proved to be 
inadequate deterrents. The spate of toxic dumping that took place in the 
1980s led the Organization of African Unity (OAU)85 to pass a resolution 
urging all member states to ban all imports of waste chemicals, metals, and 
radioactive materials, calling the trafficking in hazardous waste a “crime 
against Africa and the African people.”86 The OAU passed the resolution 
in 1988, shortly after the toxic dumping scandal in Nigeria came to light. 
The resolution condemned the dumping of hazardous waste by MNCs87 
                                                     
 81 See Fiona Harvey, Trafigura Lessons Have Not Been Learned, Report Warns, GUARDIAN (Sept. 
25, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/sep/25/trafigura-lessons-toxic-waste-
dumping. 
 82 See Call for Criminal Investigation, supra note 74. 
 83 For further discussion of the case against Trafigura, see Cyril Gwam, Symposium Powering the 
Future: A 21st Century Guide for Energy Practitioners: Human Rights Implications of Illicit Toxic 
Waste Dumping from Developing Countries Including the U.S.A., Especially Texas to Africa, in 
particular Nigeria, 38 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 241, 261 (2013); Holy Hall, Super-Injunction, 
What’s Your Function, 18 COMM. L. & POL’Y 309, 320 (2013). 
 84 See Chris Okeke, Africa and the Environment, 3 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 37, 62 (1996). 
 85 The OAU “steered Africa’s political and ideological matters since its inception” in 1963. ABOU 
JENG, PEACEBUILDING IN THE AFRICAN UNION: LAW PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICE, 136 (2012). 
 86 Organization of African Unity: Council of Ministers Resolution on Dumping of Nuclear and 
Industrial Waste in Africa, art. 1 May 23, 1988, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 567 (1989) [hereinafter 
OAU Resolution]. 
 87 Id. art. 2. 
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and urged its members to stop arranging for waste dumping.88 It also 
sought to require that dumpers “clean up the areas that have already been 
contaminated by them.”89 Although this resolution was a non-binding 
political statement, it would go on to lay the foundation for the position 
that African states would adopt regarding the importing of hazardous 
waste from outside Africa. African countries’ individual experiences with 
toxic colonialism are emblematic of why greater cooperation was needed 
in regulating hazardous waste. The experience with toxic colonialism on 
the continent also influenced the attempt to regionally criminalize the 
trafficking of hazardous waste on the continent and the subsequent attempt 
through the Malabo Protocol to create a regional venue for such 
prosecutions. 
II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING 
HAZARDOUS WASTE & AFRICAN REGIONAL INNOVATION 
This part will explore how the inadequate international legal 
framework for regulating hazardous waste led to the attempt to criminalize 
the trafficking in hazardous waste regionally in Africa. The intention here 
is not to provide a comprehensive analysis of the main shortcomings of 
this area of international law.90 Instead, this part briefly highlights the 
existing state of international law governing the import of hazardous waste 
and the control of transboundary movements of such wastes and analyzes 
African attempts to innovate regionally. This part demonstrates how 
African states have been at the forefront of efforts to penalize trafficking 
in hazardous waste—leading the way through a ban in a regional treaty, 
which would subsequently influence the direction of international law 
more generally. African states once again are at the forefront of shaping 
international law in this area by moving to prosecute trafficking in 
hazardous waste through a common forum under the Malabo Protocol. 
A. THE INADEQUATE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING 
                                                     
 88 Id. art. 3. 
 89 Id. art. 2. 
 90 For more on the limitations of the current legal framework, see generally Frederic Megret, The 
Problem of an International Criminal Law of the Environment, 36 COLUM. J. ENVT’L. L. 195, 201 
(2011); Robert Percival, Global Law and the Environment, 86 WASH. L. REV. 579 (2011); Pratt, 
supra note 14, at 167–71. 
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HAZARDOUS WASTE 
This sub-section gives much-needed context on the international 
regulation of hazardous waste. The treaty governing this area—the Basel 
Convention of 1989—did not provide for a complete prohibition on the 
trafficking of hazardous waste. Consequently, African states insisted on 
such a ban in a regional treaty—the Bamako Convention of 1991. To date, 
the international regime governing this area of law has not adopted the 
abolitionist position seen in the Bamako Convention. Efforts to change the 
international regime through an amendment to the Basel Convention 
(Basel Ban Amendment), which would adopt the African prohibition on 
hazardous waste rule globally, have stalled due to the resistance of 
countries in the Global North. This stalemate at the international level 
helps to explain in part why African states, through the Malabo Protocol, 
are attempting to create a regional forum for prosecuting the crime of 
trafficking in hazardous waste. Article 28L in the Malabo Protocol can 
only be understood against this background as it incorporates provisions 
articulated in the regional Bamako Convention of 1991. 
1. International Regulation Through the Basel Convention of 1989 
The Basel Convention of 1989, which entered into force in 1992, 
is the primary international agreement for the regulation of hazardous 
waste.91 Prior to this treaty, the international regulation in this area 
consisted of non-binding soft law. For example, in 1987 UNEP gathered a 
group of experts to develop an agreement for the “environmentally sound 
management of hazardous waste,” which came to be known as the Cairo 
Guidelines.92 Global concerns about hazardous waste “sparked a desire to 
create a more binding agreement” and led to the Basel Convention.93 As 
of March 2018, 186 states are party to the Basel Convention.94 
                                                     
 91 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and Their 
Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 649 (entered into force May 5, 1992), at 119, 
http://www.basel.int/Portals/4/Basel%20Convention/docs/text/BaselConventionText-e.pdf 
[hereinafter Basel Convention]. 
 92 United Nations Environment Programme, Cairo Guidelines and Principles for the Environmentally 
Sound Management of Hazardous Waste, June 17, 1987. 
 93 Pratt, supra note 14, at 158. 
 94 See Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and Their Disposal, BASEL CONVENTION 
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The Basel Convention works more like a trade regime—it seeks 
to control the movement of hazardous waste “through a system of prior 
informed consent, strict notification, and tracking requirements.”95 Under 
the Convention, the movement of hazardous waste is only permitted where 
the exporting country does not have the capacity to dispose of the material 
“in an environmentally sound and efficient manner,” or the waste is 
required in the importing country as a raw material for recycling or 
recovery.96 If prior informed consent is not received by the exporting 
country from each state involved, or if consent is obtained through 
“falsification, misrepresentation, or fraud” the movement of hazardous 
waste is considered illegal trafficking under the Convention.97 
The Basel Convention imposes certain general obligations on state 
parties. These include ensuring that the generation of hazardous wastes 
within the state is “reduced to a minimum, considering social, 
technological, and economic aspects.”98 The Basel Convention also 
requires certain notifications between state parties when hazardous wastes 
will be moved between or amongst them. To start, the exporting state must 
notify the importing state of any proposed transport of hazardous wastes.99 
Additionally, the importing state must then respond in writing, expressing 
its consent to the movement, denying permission for the movement, or 
requesting additional information.100 The Basel Convention also regulates 
the transnational movement from a state party to non-state parties. 
Furthermore, Article 9 of the Convention provides that any transboundary 
movement of hazardous wastes or other wastes shall be deemed “illegal” 
if the movement occurs: 
(a) without notification pursuant to the provisions of this Convention 
to all states concerned; or 
(b) without the consent pursuant to the provisions of this Convention 
of a State concerned; or 
                                                     
http://www.basel.int/Countries/StatusofRatifications/PartiesSignatories/tabid/4499/Default.aspx 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2018). 
 95 Pratt, supra note 14, at 160. 
 96 Basel Convention, supra note 91, at 17; see also Pratt, supra note 14, at 160. 
 97 Basel Convention, supra note 91, at 23. 
 98 Id. art. 4(2)(a). 
 99 Id. art. 6(1). 
 100 Id. art. 6(2). 
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(c) with consent obtained from States concerned through falsification, 
misrepresentation or fraud; or 
(d) [in a manner] that does not conform in a material way with the 
documents; or 
(e) [in a manner] that results in deliberate disposal (e.g. dumping) of 
hazardous wastes or other wastes in contravention of this Convention 
and of general principles of international law.101 
In the event of illegal trafficking in hazardous waste, the Basel 
Convention provides (depending on fault) that the exporter or generating 
state take back the waste if practicable or otherwise dispose of it.102 Where 
the importer or the disposing state is found to be at fault, then that state is 
responsible for disposal in an environmentally safe manner, and where it 
is unclear who is at fault amongst the parties, the Convention provides that 
the parties are to cooperate to make sure that the waste is disposed of in an 
environmentally sound manner.103 Moreover, Article 9 of the Basel 
Convention provides that each party shall introduce appropriate 
national/domestic legislation to prevent and punish illegal trafficking.104 
Instead of dictating how this is to be done, the Convention leaves it up to 
state parties whether to use tort law, criminal law, administrative law or 
other relevant areas of law to remedy this illegality.105 The parties to the 
Basel Convention more than likely envisioned that enforcement would 
take place through a tort law-regime.106 They subsequently enacted a 
Protocol setting out appropriate rules and procedures for liability and 
compensation for damage resulting from the transboundary movement and 
disposal of hazardous wastes and other wastes.107 The Basel Convention 
certainly did not provide for enforcement of trafficking in hazardous waste 
through an international or regional court like the Malabo Protocol 
envisions. 
                                                     
 101 Id. art. 9(1). 
 102 Id. art. 9(2). 
 103 Id. art. 9(3), (4). 
 104 Id. art. 9(5). 
 105 Id. art. 4(4). 
 106 Id. art. 12. 
 107 See Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Waste and their Disposal, Dec. 10, 1999, UNEP, 
http://archive.basel.int/meetings/cop/cop5/docs/prot-e.pdf [hereinafter Basel Protocol]. 
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2. Other Attempts at International Regulation of Hazardous Waste 
The Basel Convention has been followed by subsequent 
agreements and amendments, which continue to shape the international 
regulation of hazardous waste. For example, African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) states signed the Lomé IV Convention in 1990 with the 
European Economic Community.108 The Lomé IV Convention prohibited 
the export of hazardous waste from the European Community to ACP 
States, and in return the ACP states agreed not to accept waste from any 
country outside of the European Community.109 The agreement between 
the ACP states noted that, in interpreting the provisions of the ban, states 
would be guided by the principles and provisions in the 1988 OAU 
Resolution,110 which considered the trafficking in hazardous waste to be a 
“crime against Africa and the African people.”111 The Lomé IV 
Convention expired in 2000.112 
Overlapping regimes like the Basel and Lomé IV Conventions can 
result in a “race to the bottom”113 with countries seeking lower barriers to 
entry. The Cotonou Agreement, which replaced the Lomé IV Convention 
between the European Community and ACP states in 2000, illustrates this 
point.114 The Cotonou Agreement backtracks from the hazardous waste 
ban contained in the Lomé IV Agreement. Instead, the Agreement takes 
“into account issues relating to the transport and disposal of hazardous 
wastes.”115 This essentially rendered the ban meaningless, and without the 
total ban, the Cotonou Agreement is significantly weaker than the Lomé 
                                                     
 108 See Fourth African, Caribbean, and Pacific States-European Economic Community Convention of 
Lomé, Dec. 15, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 783 [hereinafter Lomé IV Convention], 
http://aei.pitt.edu/4220/1/4220.pdf. 
 109 Id. art. 39. 
 110 Id. Annex VIII Joint Declaration on Article 39 on Movements of Hazardous Waste or Radioactive 
Waste. 
 111 OAU Resolution, supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
 112 See Pratt, supra note 14, at 166. 
 113 Kenneth W. Abbott, The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change, 30 ENV’T & 
PLANNING C: GOV’T & POL’Y 571, 582 (2012) (discussing how this can lead to “pathological 
effects of unnecessary fragmentation”). 
 114 See generally Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Group of States of the One Part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the Other 
Part, June 23, 2000 O.J. (L 317) 3 (entered into force Jan. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Cotonou 
Agreement], https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/cotonou-agreement-2000_en.pdf. 
 115 Id. art. 32(1)(d). 
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IV Agreement.116 The limitations of the Cotonou regime reinforces the 
necessity for African states to act regionally to first criminalize dirty 
dumping through the Bamako Convention, and subsequently attempt to 
create a venue for penalizing and punishing traffickers of hazardous waste 
under the Malabo Protocol. 
3. Regional Innovation & Regulation of Hazardous Waste Through 
the Bamako Convention of 1991 
The OAU adopted the Bamako Convention in 1991, which built 
on its earlier resolution in 1988. The Bamako Convention entered into 
force in 1998 and imposes a duty on states to take legal, administrative, 
and other measures to prohibit the import of any hazardous wastes into 
their territories.117 Like the Basel Convention, it imposes certain general 
obligations on state parties, but the Bamako Convention imposes 
significantly more aggressive obligations. For example, the Bamako 
Convention imposes, “strict, unlimited liability as well as joint and several 
liability on hazardous waste generators.”118 This was an important 
improvement over the Basel Convention, which did not stipulate the rules 
for liability within the Convention.119 As of March 2018, the Bamako 
Convention had thirty-five signatories and twenty-seven parties.120 
One of the key motivations for the Bamako Convention was the 
failure of the Basel Convention to ban imports of hazardous waste from 
more developed countries into less developed ones. Thus, the first general 
obligation imposed by the Bamako Convention is a hazardous waste 
import ban, which created a regional ban on the importation of all 
hazardous waste into Africa and limits the transfer of hazardous waste 
within Africa.121 With respect to hazardous waste generated within Africa, 
                                                     
 116 See Pratt, supra note 14, at 166. 
 117 See generally Bamako Convention, supra note 8. 
 118 Id. art. 4(3)(b). The Bamako Convention defines a waste generator as “any person whose activity 
produces hazardous wastes, or, if that person is not known, the person who is in possession and/or 
control of those wastes.” Id. art. 1(20). 
 119 Basel Convention, supra note 91, art. 12. 
 120 See Parties to the Bamako Convention, AFR. UNION, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7774-
sl-bamako_convention_on_the_ban_of_the_import_into_africa_and_the_control_o.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2018). 
 121 See generally Bamako Convention, supra note 8. 
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the Convention mimics the Basel Convention provisions.122 OAU member 
states were dissatisfied with the Basel Convention, which does not 
explicitly ban the export of hazardous waste.123 Instead, the Basel 
Convention has a limited ban on exports and imports of hazardous waste 
to and from non-parties to the Convention.124 Accordingly, almost all OAU 
countries, refused to ratify the initial Basel Convention.125 The two 
conventions in many ways reflect the split between the Global North and 
South in the regulation of hazardous waste—with the Global North 
favoring a free-trade model for hazardous waste, and African countries 
demanding a total ban on toxic waste.126 Both views emanate from 
concerns over enforcement, with the Global North viewing a total ban as 
impossible to enforce, and African countries viewing the free-trade model 
as impossible to monitor or control effectively due to disparities in 
technological and environmental infrastructure.127 This view was 
reinforced by the series of toxic dumping scandals that took place in 
Africa, even after the Basel Convention came into force.128 This may also 
help to explain why the scope of what constitutes hazardous waste is much 
wider in the Bamako Convention than in the Basel Convention.129 
Additionally, the Convention stipulates that any importation of 
hazardous waste into Africa “shall be deemed illegal and a criminal act.”130 
This was a significant development from the Basel Convention, which 
considered trafficking “illegal,” but not criminal.131 The same five 
conditions of illegality, quoted above in the Basel Convention, can be 
found in the Bamako Convention.132 Crucially, the Bamako Convention 
goes further providing that “[e]ach Party shall introduce appropriate 
                                                     
 122 See id. art. 11. For intra-African waste trade, parties must minimize the transboundary movement 
of wastes and only conduct it with consent of the importing and transit states among other controls. 
Parties are to minimize the production of hazardous wastes and cooperate to ensure that wastes are 
treated and disposed of in an environmentally sound manner. See id. 
 123 See Jennifer R. Kitt, Waste Exports to the Developing World: A Global Response, 7 GEO. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 485, 500–01 (1995). 
 124 See Basel Convention, supra note 91, art. 4(5). 
 125 See Vu, supra note 49, at 410. 
 126 See Atteh, supra note 15, at 283. 
 127 See id. 
 128 See infra Section II.C. 
 129 Compare Basel Convention, supra note 91, art. 1, Annex I, Annex II, with Bamako Convention, 
supra note 8, art. 2, Annex I, Annex II. 
 130 Bamako Convention, supra note 8, art. 4(1). 
 131 Basel Convention, supra note 91, art. 9. 
 132 Bamako Convention, supra note 8, art. 9(1). 
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national legislation for imposing criminal penalties on all persons who 
have planned, committed, or assisted in such illegal imports. Such 
penalties shall be sufficiently high to both punish and deter such 
conduct.”133 As such, the Bamako Convention envisions that trafficking in 
hazardous waste will be regulated not simply through a tort-law regime 
like the Basel Convention, but crucially through each state’s domestic 
penal law. Thus, the Bamako Convention provides a clear rationale to 
understand the later move to create a regional forum to prosecute the 
trafficking of hazardous waste in the Malabo Protocol. It is likely that 
parties found that only relying on domestic enforcement to prosecute 
trafficking in hazardous waste was leading to insufficient punishment and 
deterrence and anticipated that the creation of a regional court through the 
Malabo Protocol would lead to better results. 
4. From Regional Innovation Through Bamako to Attempts to 
Strengthen the International Regulatory Framework Through 
Basel 
The overlapping Bamako and Basel regimes for regulating 
trafficking in hazardous waste led to generative outcomes for the 
progressive development of international law. Some scholars have 
postulated that competing regimes can also “generate positive feedback:” 
providing incentives for a “race to the top.”134 This occurs where countries 
take stronger action on a given issue in one regime, which generates 
imitation by others.135 An excellent example of this is how the Bamako 
Convention’s imposition of strict liability on “hazardous waste 
generators”136 influenced the Basel Convention’s Protocol on Liability and 
Compensation.137 Recall, the Bamako Convention entered into force in 
1998,138 while the Basel Convention required parties to create and adopt a 
protocol on liability in 1989.139 The Basel Protocol was only adopted after 
                                                     
 133 Id., art. 9(2). 
 134 Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change, 9 PERSP. ON 
POL. 7, 19 (2011). 
 135 See id. 
 136 Bamako Convention, supra note 8, art. 4(3)(b), 1(20). 
 137 See Basel Protocol, supra note 107. 
 138 See Bamako Convention, supra note 8. 
 139 See Basel Convention, supra note 91, art. 12. 
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heated negotiations in December of 1999.140 The Basel Protocol provides 
for strict liability for damages where parties to the Convention maintain 
control of the hazardous waste, but any person can also be subject to fault-
based liability under the general principles of tort law.141 The Protocol 
needs twenty ratifications to enter into force—as of March 2018, it only 
had eleven.142 The stalled efforts at ratification reflects the continued split 
between the Global North and South on the regulation of hazardous waste. 
Another instance of how the Bamako Convention is influencing 
international law regulating hazardous waste is the Basel Ban 
Amendment.143 In 1995, state parties to the Basel Convention decided by 
consensus that a total ban of hazardous waste should be developed.144 The 
Ban Amendment would go further than the Bamako Convention by 
prohibiting all exports of hazardous wastes between developed and 
developing countries, not just exports and imports within Africa like the 
Bamako Convention.145 The Ban Amendment technically needs sixty-two 
ratifications to come into effect.146 As of March 2018, ninety-three parties 
have ratified the Ban, yet it has not entered into force,147 because for many 
years parties disagreed on the interpretation of the provision on 
amendments to the Convention.148 In 2011, state parties agreed that the 
                                                     
 140 See Pratt, supra note 14, at 163, 164. 
 141 See Basel Protocol, supra note 107, art. 4. 
 142 See Parties to the Basel Protocol of the Basel Convention, BASEL CONVENTION, 
http://www.basel.int/Countries/StatusofRatifications/TheProtocol/tabid/1345/Default.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2018). 
 143 See Decision III/1 Amendment to the Basel Convention, Third Meeting of the Conference of the 
Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous Waste 
and Their Disposal, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CHW.3/35 (Sept. 18–22, 1995). 
 144 Id. (explaining how the eighty-two parties present at the Third Meeting of the Conference of the 
Parties of the Basel Convention adopted the decision by consensus on Sept. 22, 1995); see also 
Basel Convention, supra note 91, art. 4A, Annex VII [hereinafter Ban Amendment]. 
 145 Id. 
 146 See id. art. 17(5) (providing that amendments enter into force between the parties when “at least 
three-fourths of the Parties who accepted them” ratify the amendment); see also Pratt, supra note 
14, at 163 (noting that sixty-two ratifications represents three-fourths of the parties present at the 
Third Meeting of the Conference of the Parties). 
 147 See Amendment to the Basel Convention on the control of transboundary movement of hazardous 
waste and their disposal, BASEL CONVENTION, 
http://www.basel.int/Countries/StatusofRatifications/BanAmendment/tabid/1344/Default.aspx 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2018). 
 148 See The Basel Convention Ban Amendment, BASEL CONVENTION, 
http://www.basel.int/Implementation/LegalMatters/BanAmendment/Overview/tabid/1484/Defaul
t.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2018). 
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Ban Amendment will enter into force when three-fourths of those parties 
that were parties at the time of the adoption of the amendment ratify it.149 
The controversy on the Ban Amendment also reflects the 
continued split between the Global North and South on the regulation of 
hazardous waste. Countries have continued to disagree on the need and 
utility of a total ban on hazardous waste. Because the Basel Convention is 
a compromise document, the basic obligations under the treaty regime had 
to be lower to get more state parties to join the regime.150 This also helps 
to explain the stalled efforts to try to extend the reach of the original Basel 
Convention with the Basel Protocol and the Ban Amendment. Currently, 
the only agreement that bans the import of hazardous waste is the Bamako 
Convention with African state parties. The rest of the international 
agreements in this area seek to put varying levels of control on the 
transboundary movements of such wastes. The delayed efforts at getting a 
harder enforcement regime in place, provides additional normative 
justification for the Malabo Protocol’s move to create a regional court to 
prosecute traffickers of hazardous waste. 
The African innovation in the field of environmental and criminal 
law is akin to how regional systems have demonstrated creativity and 
flexibility in other areas of the law. For example, regional systems adopted 
regional human rights treaties to fill the gaps in international law.151 
Regional systems also innovated to cover rights and duties not recognized 
in the main international human rights treaties.152 The regional human 
rights system has functioned to strengthen the enforcement of human 
rights across the globe and fill in gaps that the international system alone 
                                                     
 149 For further discussion, see Amendments, BASEL CONVENTION, 
http://www.basel.int/TheConvention/Overview/Amendments/Overview/tabid/2759/Default.aspx, 
(last visited Jan. 19, 2018). 
 150 See Pratt, supra note 14, at 163 (discussing how the option of a total ban was tabled until future 
conferences of the parties). 
 151 See, e.g., Chaloka Beyani, Reconstituting the Universal: Human Rights as a Regional Idea, in 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 173, 176 (Conor Gearty & Costas Douzinas 
eds., 2012). 
 152 Compare African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) (explaining concept of peoples’ rights), and the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OEA/Ser.L./V.II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (May 2, 1948), 
reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, 
OEA/Ser.L.V./II.82, doc. 6, rev. 1 at 1 (explaining concept of duties), with G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948), International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Rep. 102-23, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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cannot accommodate.153 Given the experience of regionalization in the 
international human rights regime, a similar outcome may pertain in the 
fields of international environmental and criminal law. 
The regional criminalization of hazardous waste in the Bamako 
Convention allows for more regulation than was possible at the global 
level. Yet, the international regime created by the Basel Convention does 
not provide for any enforcement mechanisms for illegal trafficking in 
hazardous waste. Instead, it provides that parties should adopt domestic 
legislation for the prevention and punishment of trafficking in hazardous 
waste.154 However, since the OAU resolution in 1988, African states have 
considered the trafficking in hazardous waste to be a “criminal act.”155 This 
view was reiterated and turned into hard obligation under the Bamako 
Convention.156 Under Bamako, criminal penalties were to be “sufficiently 
high to both punish and deter such conduct.”157 Yet, despite the strong 
provisions of the Bamako Convention,158 the African state parties to 
Bamako simply lacked the capacity to effectively enforce the provisions 
domestically and prevent toxic colonialism within their borders.159 Indeed, 
none of the international legal agreements discussed above have 
adequately addressed the illegal trade in hazardous waste, which is often 
transported under false pretenses.160 Additionally, no state has the ability 
to check and inspect each shipment that enters its ports to see if it contains 
hazardous waste.161 Notwithstanding the widespread capacity limitations 
on an individual state level, the Malabo Protocol provides a potentially 
more robust venue for the regional prosecutions of trafficking in hazardous 
waste through article 28L. 
Article 28L of the Malabo Protocol is derived from longstanding 
efforts by African states to criminalize and punish trafficking in hazardous 
waste. Certainly, the Bamako Convention envisioned future regional 
agreements regarding the transboundary movement and management of 
                                                     
 153 See Beyani, supra note 151, at 190; George William Mugwanya, Realizing Universal Human 
Rights Norms Through Regional Human Rights Mechanisms: Reinvigorating the African System, 
10 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 35, 40 (1999). 
 154 See Basel Convention, supra note 91, art. 9(5). 
 155 See OAU Resolution, supra note 86. 
 156 Bamako Convention, supra note 8, art. 9(2). 
 157 Id. 
 158 See id. art. 4. 
 159 See infra Section II.B. 
 160 See Pratt, supra note 14, at 167. 
 161 Id. at 167 n.173. 
SIRLEAF_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2018  1:06 PM 
350 Wisconsin International Law Journal 
 
hazardous wastes generated in Africa and allowed for such arrangements 
so long as they “do not derogate from the environmentally sound 
management of hazardous wastes as required” by Bamako and are “no less 
environmentally sound than those provided for” under the Convention.162 
Article 28L of the Malabo Protocol is consistent with the Bamako 
Convention and promotes “South-South co-operation in the 
implementation of the Convention”163 through the creation of a regional 
forum for prosecutions of traffickers of hazardous waste amongst others. 
B. AFRICAN REGIONAL INNOVATION & ENFORCEMENT THROUGH 
MALABO 
This sub-section discusses some of the challenges that might arise 
with the enforcement of Article 28L. Under the Bamako Convention, state 
parties were urged to cooperate and consider other “enforcement 
mechanisms” to ensure that no imports of hazardous waste enter Africa.164 
The Malabo Protocol is potentially such an enforcement mechanism—it 
creates a regional venue for prosecuting trafficking in hazardous waste, 
amongst other crimes. The Protocol improves upon the international 
framework for regulating the trafficking of hazardous waste. Article 28L 
of the Malabo Protocol provides that “any import, or failure to re-import 
transboundary movement or export hazardous waste proscribed by the 
Bamako Convention . . . shall constitute the offence of trafficking in 
hazardous waste” and fall under the criminal jurisdiction of the regional 
court.165 
1. Interpretative Challenges 
Article 28L potentially invites confusion as it requires reference 
to a separate legal text to determine the relevant criminal prohibitions. 
When one turns to the Bamako Convention, Article 1(22) informs the 
reader that illegal traffic “means any transboundary movement of 
hazardous wastes as specified in article 9 of this Convention.”166 Article 
                                                     
 162 Bamako Convention, supra note 8, art. 11(1). 
 163 Id. art. 11(4). 
 164 Bamako Convention, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(b). 
 165 Malabo Protocol, supra note 2, art. 28L. 
 166 Bamako Convention, supra note 8, art. 1(22). 
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9(2) provides for the criminal penalties to be imposed on “all persons who 
have planned, committed, or assisted” in illegal trafficking in hazardous 
waste.167 This occurs according to Article 9(1), when transboundary 
movement of waste occurs without notification or without consent of the 
relevant state, when consent is obtained through falsification, 
misrepresentation, or fraud, and when the waste does not conform 
materially with the documents.168 While it might have been possible to 
interpret Article 28L of Malabo such that it could cover only those 
offenses that the Bamako Convention itself says are criminal acts under 
Article 9, this interpretative methodology is unavailable because of the 
broad scope of the language in the last provision. Article 9(1)(e) stipulates 
criminal penalties “when hazardous waste is deliberately disposed of in 
contravention of the Convention and of the general principles of 
international law.”169 
Article 9(1)(e) of the Bamako Convention is the most ambiguous 
in terms of figuring out the scope of criminal liability under Article 28L 
of the Malabo Protocol. For one, it is not exactly clear what general 
principles Article 9(1)(e) refers to. And, as discussed above, the general 
international law framework for regulating hazardous waste does not 
attach criminal penalties to trafficking in hazardous waste. Moreover, 
there are numerous ways to dispose of hazardous waste in “contravention” 
of Bamako. While Article 4(1) of the Bamako Convention clearly makes 
importing hazardous waste into Africa an illegal and criminal act, it is not 
evident that all of the obligations that states undertook in Bamako were to 
also have that effect.170 For example, Article 4(2) of the Bamako 
Convention, which bans the dumping of hazardous waste at sea and in 
internal waters, specifies that all such actions shall be illegal, but does not 
contain the same “and a criminal act” of Article 4(1)’s prohibition.171 Thus, 
it is unclear whether the Malabo Protocol wishes to expand Bamako to 
criminalize trafficking in hazardous waste at sea and in internal waters. 
In addition, the Bamako Convention contains a host of very 
detailed obligations that state parties undertook for the transportation of 
hazardous waste within Africa.172 With some of these provisions—such as 
                                                     
 167 Id. art. 9(2). 
 168 Id. art. 9(1)(a)–(d). 
 169 Id. art. 9(1)(e). 
 170 Id. art. 4(1)–(2). 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. art. 4(3)(i)–(u). 
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Bamako’s expansive definition of what constitutes “hazardous waste”—it 
is apparent that the Malabo Protocol sought to include them within the 
criminal jurisdiction of the court.173 However, for other obligations, like 
parties agreeing “not to allow the export of hazardous wastes for disposal 
within the area South of 60 degrees South Latitude,”174 it is not as 
straightforward. Additionally, the Bamako Convention contains detailed 
rules about the specific form and timing of notifications to be exchanged 
prior to the transportation of hazardous wastes across borders.175 It would 
seem nonsensical to impose criminal liability for transportation of wastes 
that do not conform to every single provision in the Convention. 
Moreover, this is likely not what the drafters of Malabo intended. Yet it is 
certainly possible to interpret Article 28L quite broadly—to criminalize 
any violation of any rule or regulation contained in the Bamako 
Convention governing the transportation of hazardous waste across state 
boundaries. Accordingly, it would be helpful if state parties further 
clarified what exactly was being criminalized so that actors can be aware 
of the permissible and impermissible bounds of conduct. Moreover, this 
would help ensure that the court’s resources are used judiciously, and that 
valuable time is not spent prosecuting minor violations of the Bamako 
Convention that the Malabo Protocol drafters did not intend to criminalize 
regionally nor dedicate resources to prosecuting. 
The analysis above indicates that the Protocol needs to be much 
clearer about what specifically is being made illegal and criminalized. The 
Bamako Convention sets out many detailed rules relating to the transport 
of waste. It seems unreasonable to impose criminal liability for transport 
of wastes that do not conform with every single provision in the 
Convention. Accordingly, much more clarification is needed. This is 
important because it potentially violates one of the bedrock principles of 
criminal justice—legality. Individuals need to be given fair warning and 
notice about the criminal laws such that they can conform their conduct 
                                                     
 173 Compare Malabo Protocol, supra note 2, art. 28L(2), with Bamako Convention, supra note 8, art. 
2, 4(3)(i). The Bamako Convention not only includes radioactive wastes, but also considers any 
waste with a listed hazardous characteristic or a listed constituent as a hazardous waste. The 
Convention also covers national definitions of hazardous waste. Finally, products that are banned, 
severely restricted, or have been the subject of prohibitions, are also covered under the Convention 
as wastes to be criminally prohibited from importation into Africa. See Bamako Convention, supra 
note 8. 
 174 Bamako Convention, supra note 8, art. 4(3)(l). 
 175 Id. art. 6. 
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with the dictates of the law. In short, the Protocol would benefit from a 
clear statement of which “proscribed” practices it is making illegal. 
2. Implementation Challenges 
If the Malabo Protocol enters into force, the regional court’s 
potentially expansive jurisdiction might assist with more effective 
prosecutions of toxic dumping incidents. Under Malabo, the court can 
exercise jurisdiction over trafficking in hazardous waste and other crimes 
committed after that date.176 The Assembly of the Heads of State and 
Government, the Peace and Security Council177 of the AU, state parties, 
and the independent prosecutor178 will be able to submit cases to the 
court.179 Under the Protocol, the court would only exercise its jurisdiction 
where a State accepts its jurisdiction, where the crime was committed on 
the territory of the State, where the accused or victim is a national of the 
state, and/or when the vital interests of a state are threatened by the 
extraterritorial acts of non-nationals.180 The Protocol does not give the 
court jurisdiction over persons under the age of eighteen during the alleged 
commission of the crime.181 The Protocol’s provision on corporate 
criminal liability182 will be important in prosecutions of traffickers. 
Controversially, the Protocol does not give the court jurisdiction over any 
“serving AU Head of State or Government, or anybody acting or entitled 
to act in such capacity, or other senior state officials based on their 
functions, during their tenure of office.”183 This immunities provision is in 
stark contrast with the statutes of other international criminal tribunals.184 
It has caused significant backlash towards the Malabo Protocol from 
                                                     
 176 See Malabo Protocol, supra note 2, art. 46E. 
 177 See Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 
art. 2 (July 9, 2002) [hereinafter PSC Protocol], http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-protocol-
en.pdf (establishing the PSC as the permanent mechanism for conflict prevention and resolution 
on the Continent). 
 178 See Malabo Protocol, supra note 2, art. 46G. 
 179 See id. art. 15. 
 180 See id. art. 46E. 
 181 See id. art. 46D. 
 182 See id. art. 46C. 
 183 Id. art. 46A bis. 
 184 See SCSL Statute, supra note 5, art. 6; Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 27 (detailing the irrelevance 
of official capacity for exempting someone from criminal responsibility); ICTR Statute, supra note 
5, art. 6; ICTY Statute, supra note 5, art. 7. 
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scholars and practitioners.185 This sub-section discusses some of the 
implementation issues raised by the corporate criminal liability and 
immunity provisions for prosecuting traffickers of hazardous waste 
below.186 
Additionally, there are many political, financial, and other 
obstacles that may impede the regional criminal court’s ability to offer a 
robust prosecution mechanism for trafficking in hazardous waste. First, 
the regional criminal court that Malabo envisions may never be established 
due to insufficient political will. Secondly, if it is established, it is likely 
that the court will still face challenges regarding political will to enforce 
decisions. It is also likely that the regional criminal court would face 
credibility issues because of the issue of official immunity. Moreover, the 
court would likely have difficulty guarding against accusations of bias, 
particularly when the accused individuals or entities are from outside of 
the African region. Additionally, the regional court would probably 
encounter challenges ensuring adequate funding, meeting international 
fair trial standards, and conducting its proceedings with sufficient 
transparency. Furthermore, the regional criminal court may suffer from 
having less judicial and lawyering experience than exists at the 
international level. Notwithstanding these theoretical and policy concerns, 
the Malabo Protocol’s criminalization and provision of a common forum 
for prosecutions of the trafficking of hazardous waste187 pushes the 
boundaries of international environmental and criminal law in a much-
needed direction. The failure of both domestic and international 
institutions to effectively deal with trafficking in hazardous waste has 
created a space for African states to innovate regionally and to attempt to 
progressively develop international law by providing for a regional 
institution to penalize and prosecute this offense. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF CRIMINALIZING AND PROSECUTING 
                                                     
 185 See, e.g., Mark Kerster, What Gives? African Union Head of State Immunity, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT 
(July 7, 2014), http://justiceinconflict.org/2014/07/07/what-gives-african-union-head-of-state-
immunity/; Mireille Affa’a-Mindzie, Leaders Agree on Immunity for themselves During 
Expansion of African Court, IPI GLOBAL OBSERVATORY (July 23, 2014), 
http://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/07/leaders-agree-immunity-expansion-african-court/. 
 186 See infra Part III. For further discussion, see generally Sirleaf, supra note 17. 
 187 See Malabo Protocol, supra note 2, art. 28L. 
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HAZARDOUS WASTE REGIONALLY 
This part analyzes the potential implications of criminalizing and 
prosecuting trafficking in hazardous waste regionally. Recollecting that 
the Bamako Convention called for the imposition of criminal penalties 
domestically, and that said penalties “shall be sufficiently high to both 
punish and deter” trafficking in hazardous waste.188 Further, the Bamako 
Convention requires that parties to the Convention “co-operate with one 
another and with relevant African organisations, to improve and achieve 
the environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes.”189 Because 
the Bamako Convention laid the groundwork for Article 28L of the 
Malabo Protocol, this part analyzes whether Article 28L furthers the 
criminal prosecution objectives of the Bamako Convention. It does so by 
considering whether the regional prosecution of trafficking in hazardous 
waste through the Malabo Protocol contributes towards some of the more 
traditional goals of punishment like retribution and deterrence as well as 
newer theories of punishment like restorative justice and expressive 
condemnation. Lastly, this part examines how some of the more pressing 
challenges might be resolved through creative interpretation of Article 
28L of the Protocol to assist with furthering the sound regulation of 
hazardous wastes. 
A. REGIONAL CRIMINALIZATION OF TRAFFICKING IN HAZARDOUS 
WASTE & RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
How should the traditional notions of criminal law, based as they 
are on the idea of a natural person with free will to choose to engage in 
culpable actions, be applied to corporations deemed guilty of illegal 
dumping? And in relation to this, how can we think of the regional 
prosecution of trafficking in hazardous waste in relation to its ability to 
further retribution? Retributive justice theories of punishment emanated 
from the desire for vengeance and “just deserts” for offenders.190 Most 
modern retributivists, however, reject the notion of an “eye for [an] eye,” 
and instead seek to determine the degree of punishment in relation to the 
                                                     
 188 Bamako Convention, supra note 8, art. 9(2). 
 189 Id. art. 10(1). 
 190 See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL PROPOSAL (Helen O’Brien 
trans., 1927); SUSAN JACOBY, WILD JUSTICE: THE EVOLUTION OF REVENGE (1983). 
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magnitude of the alleged crimes.191 The Malabo Protocol allows for the 
imposition of prison sentences, pecuniary fines, and forfeiture of property 
acquired unlawfully.192 The Protocol also stipulates that the regional court 
should be guided by the “gravity of the offence and the individual 
circumstances of the convicted person.”193 The analysis above indicates 
that states have provided for criminal sentences ranging from twenty years 
to life imprisonment and fines of up to $1.6 million for trafficking in 
hazardous waste.194 It is not clear how “grave” the regional court would 
determine the crime of trafficking in hazardous waste is, and whether this 
will comport with the sentences or fines available domestically. If the 
regional court’s sentencing or penalties for those found guilty of 
trafficking in hazardous waste vary significantly from domestic norms, 
this could frustrate the ability of the regional court to further retributive 
justice goals. The regional court might need to develop something akin to 
the “margin of appreciation” doctrine used by the European Court of 
Human Rights195 for sentencing and ensuring its judgments comport with 
most states’ practices in the region. 
Furthermore, because the Malabo Protocol bars the prosecution of 
not only Heads of States, but also of “senior state officials” based on their 
functions,196 leaders who are accused of trafficking in hazardous waste 
cannot be investigated and prosecuted before the regional court. This is a 
serious challenge to the court’s ability to fulfill retributive justice goals 
given the role that some African leaders have played in facilitating the 
dumping of hazardous waste in their territories.197 Failure to prosecute all 
equally culpable individuals violates the retributive principle of just 
deserts, as well as the principle of proportionality that all like crimes 
should be treated the same. 
                                                     
 191 Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and 
Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145, 147 (2008); see also Allison Marston Danner, Constructing 
a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Law Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REV. 415, 444 (2001); 
Andrew von Hirsch & Nils Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living- Standard Analysis, 11 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2–3 (1991). 
 192 Malabo Protocol, supra note 2, art. 43A. 
 193 Id. art. 43A(4). 
 194 See supra Section II.B. 
 195 See, e.g., Paul L. McKaskle, The European Court of Human Rights: What It Is, How It Works, and 
Its Future, 40 UNIV. SAN. FRAN. L. REV. 1, 49 (2005) (explaining that the concept of margin 
appreciation allows for “countries to differ in what is acceptable under the terms of the Convention 
based on cultural differences”). 
 196 Malabo Protocol, supra note 2, art. 46Abis. 
 197 See supra Section II.B. 
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The ability of the regional court to contribute towards retributive 
justice goals may also be limited because the Protocol makes it dependent 
on member states for the enforcement of its sentences and fines.198 
Complications could arise where an individual is sentenced, or an entity is 
fined by the regional court for trafficking in hazardous waste, but no state 
indicates their willingness to accept and imprison the sentenced person or 
give effect to the fine ordered by the regional court. Moreover, the Malabo 
Protocol also provides for the pardon or commutation of sentences where 
a person convicted by the regional court would be eligible for a pardon or 
commutation in the jurisdiction where the convicted person is 
imprisoned.199 In these circumstances, the regional court could issue a 
pardon or commutation of a sentence based on the “interests of justice and 
the general principles of law.”200 Depending on how the regional court 
interprets these provisions, this could potentially allow for states to work 
around the attempt to criminalize and punish the trafficking in hazardous 
waste regionally. However, because the Malabo Protocol situates the 
regional criminal court within a larger judicial architecture in the AU, this 
can potentially be counteracted. Other relevant regional bodies that may 
assist with issues of compliance include the Panel of the Wise, the Peace 
and Security Council and the African Standby Force.201 Of course, the 
existence of a connection with regional institutions does not completely 
solve issues of non-compliance.202 For the reasons discussed above, the 
regional prosecution of trafficking in hazardous waste may have limited 
ability to further retribution, which is a traditional goal of punishment. 
Accordingly, the regional court may face significant limitations in 
furthering one of the Bamako Convention’s objectives of punishing 
trafficking in hazardous waste via retribution. 
Another concern is the court’s ability to effectively exercise its 
control over offenders, especially offenders outside of the territory of any 
state party. Generally, hazardous waste moves from the Global North to 
                                                     
 198 See Malabo Protocol, supra note 2, art. 46J, 46Jbis. 
 199 Id. art. 46K. 
 200 Id. 
 201 See PSC Protocol, supra note 177, art. 7, 11, 13(1) (providing the authority for the Peace and 
Security Council, establishing the Panel of the Wise, and providing for the African Standby Force). 
 202 George William Mugwanya, International Criminal Tribunals in Africa, in THE AFRICAN 
REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM: 30 YEARS AFTER THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND 
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 301, 307–10 (Mainsuli Ssenyonjo ed., 2012) (discussing the difficulties securing 
state cooperation with the criminal tribunals in Rwanda and Sierra Leone); see also Beyani, supra 
note 151, at 187. 
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South. Thus, although this will not necessarily always be the case, there is 
a high likelihood that violators importing waste will be coming from states 
that are not parties to the Protocol. The court may, thus, have a challenging 
time bringing offenders from the Global North before the regional court 
for trial. For this reason, the Protocol’s effectiveness and legitimacy could 
be enhanced by expanding the scope of its cooperation regime. 
B. REGIONAL CRIMINALIZATION OF TRAFFICKING IN HAZARDOUS 
WASTE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & EXPRESSIVE CONDEMNATION 
1. Restorative Justice 
The prosecution of trafficking in hazardous waste through the 
regional court may help to further restorative justice goals. Restorative 
justice can be conceptualized as “a process in which offenders, victims, 
their representatives and representatives of the community come together 
to agree on a response to a crime.”203 The overwhelming focus is to assist 
with “re-establishing social equilibrium”204 and facilitating “corrective 
changes in the record, in relationships, and in future behavior.”205 The 
Malabo Protocol empowers the court to provide compensation and 
reparation to victims.206 The Malabo Protocol also provides for the 
establishment of a trust fund for victims to provide legal aid and 
assistance.207 The ability of the court to contribute towards restorative 
justice goals may be limited if the court interprets these provisions 
narrowly. The court’s effectiveness may also be limited if the fund for 
victims is under-funded or if reparations are administered in a problematic 
way. However, if the regional criminal court follows the lead of the Inter-
                                                     
 203 Linda Gröning & Jørn Jacobsen, Introduction: Restorative Justice and the Criminal Justice 
System, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP 9, 12 
(Linda Gröning & Jørn Jacobsen eds., 2012). For further discussion, see generally John 
Braithwaite, Narrative and “Compulsory Compassion,” 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 425 (2006). 
See also Elizabeth Kiss, Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints: Reflections on 
Restorative Justice, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 68, 79–83 
(Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000). 
 204 Jennie E. Burnet, (In)Justice: Truth, Reconciliation, and Revenge in Rwanda’s Gacaca, in 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: GLOBAL MECHANISMS AND LOCAL REALITIES AFTER GENOCIDE AND 
MASS VIOLENCE 95, 100 (Alexander L. Hinton ed., 2010). 
 205 MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER 
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 91 (1998). 
 206 See Malabo Protocol, supra note 2, art. 20. 
 207 See id. art. 46M. 
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American Court for Human Rights in fashioning remedies, it might order 
communal reparations208 or formulate broad reparative and restorative 
measures,209 which require the state to formulate specific policies and 
programs that provide redress for the violation(s).210 There may also be 
insufficient compliance with restorative justice orders because of the 
court’s dependence on member states for enforcement.211 
The court could potentially be a vehicle for regional innovation in 
providing fuller redress to victims. The court might even require a 
convicted defendant to participate in local reconciliatory procedures as a 
means of securing reparations to victims. It is premature to determine how 
broadly the court would construe these provision, but this would be an 
improvement on the “imagined victims” of international justice advocates. 
These “imagined victims” always demand retributive justice, when in 
reality, victims have diverse desires for redress, which also emphasize 
reparative and restorative justice.212 Restorative justice approaches may be 
especially important for the crime of trafficking in hazardous waste, given 
the dire consequences that toxic dumping has on public health and the 
environment.213 The detrimental impact of trafficking in hazardous waste 
for individuals and communities may mean that imprisonment of 
traffickers or other retributive measures have less import in achieving 
justice as conceived by the affected community. This is particularly 
                                                     
 208 See, e.g., Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶¶ 224, 226 (Mar. 29, 2006). The Court fashioned an order, 
which provided that the state was to allocate $1 million to a community development fund for 
educational, housing agricultural, and health projects. See id. In addition, the state was to provide 
compensation of $20,000 each to the 17 members of the community who died as a result of events. 
See id. 
 209 For further discussion, see Thomas M. Antkowiak, An Emerging Mandate for International 
Courts: Victim-Centered Remedies and Restorative Justice, 47 STAN. J. INT’L L. 279 (2011). 
 210 See, e.g., Miguel Castro Prison v. Peru Merits, Reparations and Costs Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 160, ¶¶ 445, 451–54 (Nov. 25, 2006). The Court’s order provided amongst others 
that the state needed to carry out a public act of acknowledgement of its international responsibility 
in relation to the violations declared and for satisfaction of the next of kin. The state also had to 
conduct a public ceremony covered by the media, carry out human rights education and programs 
for the security sector, as well as create a monument for those who died as a form of reparations. 
See id. 
 211 See supra Section III.A. 
 212 See Laurel E. Fletcher, Refracted Justice: The Imagined Victim and the International Criminal 
Court, in CONTESTED JUSTICE: THE POLITICS AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT INTERVENTIONS 302, 306 (Christian De Vos, Sara Kendall & Carsten Stahn eds., 2015), 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-
programs/faculty/facultyPubsPDF.php?facID=517&pubID=41. 
 213 See supra Section I.A. 
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important in some communities within African countries where justice is 
conceptualized in “reference to communal restoration, interpersonal 
forgiveness, reconciliation, and redistributive, rather than retributive 
process.”214 Consequently, the regional criminalization and prosecution of 
trafficking in hazardous waste under Malabo may further restorative 
justice goals. As such, Article 28L would assist with furthering the 
Bamako Convention’s objectives of punishment for traffickers of 
hazardous waste. 
2. Expressive Condemnation 
The prosecution of trafficking in hazardous waste through the 
regional court may also help to further expressive condemnation goals. 
Some theorists emphasize the expressive value of punishment,215 which is 
required to reverse the false message—sent by the offender’s actions about 
the value of the victim—relative to the criminal.216 These theorists view 
punishment as a form of moral communication used to express 
condemnation, revalidate a victim’s worth, and strengthen social 
solidarity. Yet, the ability of the regional court to further expressive 
condemnation goals of punishment may be limited for many reasons. First, 
regional powers may tend to distort or even abuse regional processes217 by 
using the court to further political aims or protecting allies from the court’s 
reach. In the same way that powerful actors may shield their allies from 
potential prosecutions at the domestic or international level, the regional 
court may exhibit the same tendencies. For example, the AU has been 
notoriously silent on human rights violations taking place in Zimbabwe 
                                                     
 214 Sergey Vasiliev, Between International Criminal Justice and Injustice: On the Methodology of 
Legitimacy, 29 (draft paper on file with author). 
 215 See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (George Simpson trans., The Free 
Press 1964) (1933); David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy 
of International Criminal Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 569, 575 
(Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions 
Mean? 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 597 (1996); Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of 
International Punishment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of 
International Criminal Law, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 39, 42–45 (2007).  
 216 See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punishment, 20 
CRIME & JUST. 1, 8 (1996); Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in 
RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1, 32–33 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992); Dan M. Kahan, The 
Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1621, 1641 (1998). 
 217 See Christoph Schreuer, Regionalism v. Universalism, 6 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 477, 477 (1995). 
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and other countries with influential or revered leaders.218 The regional 
criminal court could then be subject to the criticism that it lacks sufficient 
political independence, which may limit the ability of the Court to be a 
robust mechanism for expressing condemnation of trafficking in 
hazardous waste. Yet, because there are multiple regional hegemons on 
the continent, this may counteract the ability of one state to exercise undue 
influence over the regional criminal chamber. Additionally, there is no 
reason to think of African states as a monolith—regional hegemons may 
have drastically different views on expressing condemnation on the 
trafficking of hazardous waste. 
The criminalization of trafficking in hazardous waste may assist 
in rendering international criminal trials more credible in expressing 
condemnation. International criminal trials generally focus on individual 
cases, and not the complex relationships that exist between individuals, 
groups, institutions, and other entities that make massive violations 
possible.219 “And in the effort to move away from collectivizing guilt 
(which may lead to further violence or recriminations), and instead attempt 
to individualize guilt, trials often tend to absolve other states, 
[corporations,] groups, [institutions,] bystanders, and the rest of society of 
any responsibility as if individuals committed massive violations in a 
vacuum.”220 The focus on establishing individual accountability for a small 
number of crimes may present the opportunity for many criminal 
participants, including corporations, “to rationalize or deny their own 
responsibility for crimes,”221 which limits the ability of such trials to 
express social solidarity and condemnation. The regional criminal courts’ 
ability to prosecute trafficking in hazardous waste and the provision for 
corporate criminal liability may advance the already limited ability of such 
trials to express social solidarity and condemnation, and thereby increase 
the credibility of such trials, even if minimally. This improvement, while 
not eliminating some of the problematic tendencies of such trials, would 
be a welcome development. The regional criminal court could, given the 
                                                     
 218 See generally Laurence Helfer & Karen J. Alter, Legitimacy & Lawmaking: A Tale of Three 
International Courts, 14 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 479 (2013). 
 219 See Matiangai V.S. Sirleaf, Beyond Truth & Punishment in Transitional Justice, 54 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 249 (2014). 
 220 See id. 
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prevalence of these issues in Africa, develop a regional jurisprudence222 on 
trafficking in hazardous waste,223 which may influence other jurisdictions 
to express condemnation of this crime. In sum, the regional prosecution of 
trafficking in hazardous waste may further expressive condemnation 
goals. Accordingly, Article 28L of the Malabo Protocol would assist with 
advancing the Bamako Convention’s objectives of punishment for 
traffickers of hazardous waste. 
C. REGIONAL CRIMINALIZATION OF TRAFFICKING IN HAZARDOUS 
WASTE & DETERRENCE 
The prosecution of trafficking in hazardous waste through the 
regional court could also help to further deterrence. Utilitarian theories 
focus on punishment to achieve some desired end, usually the prevention 
of future crimes.224 Deterrence theories of punishment are based on the 
rationale that potential perpetrators are dissuaded from committing 
atrocities due to the risk and fear of punishment.225 Individual or specific 
deterrence seeks to prevent future crime by setting sentences that are strict 
enough to ensure that an offender will not recidivate, while general 
deterrence attempts to prevent crime by inducing others who might be 
tempted to commit crime to desist out of fear of the penalty. 
The ability of the court to contribute towards deterrence goals may 
similarly be limited because it is dependent on member states for 
cooperation.226 In order for deterrence theory to work, the risk of getting 
caught and being punished cannot be so low as to be discounted. Yet, to 
effectively carry out any investigation and prosecution of trafficking in 
hazardous waste, the regional court is dependent on state parties for 
                                                     
 222 For example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has developed a rich jurisprudence on 
the right to truth and forced disappearances due to the prevalence of authoritarian regimes in the 
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everything from the identification and location of persons, to the arrest, 
detention, and transfer of persons to the court, as well as the freezing and 
seizure of assets for forfeiture.227 The regional criminal court may face 
significant challenges with trying to increase the likelihood of getting 
caught for trafficking in hazardous waste. 
As noted above, the illegal trafficking in hazardous waste depends 
on an underground economy,228 which may be exceedingly difficult to 
investigate and prosecute. The regional criminal court’s inability to 
effectively prosecute the trafficking in hazardous waste could be even 
more pronounced because many of the individuals or entities sought will 
likely be located outside of the continent, and those located within Africa 
may not be parties to the Malabo regime. The problem of under-detection 
was illustrated in the toxic waste scandal in Nigeria discussed above. It 
highlights how detection of this crime is likely to prove difficult. As a 
result, there is a significant risk that hazardous, even radioactive materials, 
could be transported and left in Africa undetected until residents begin to 
suffer severe negative health consequences. For example, the domestic 
prosecution of the “war on drugs” in the United States indicates that unless 
changes are made on the demand side, cracking down on the suppliers will 
only lead to more individuals and entities stepping in to fill the roles of 
those imprisoned. Furthermore, at the international level, where crimes of 
mass atrocity are committed more openly, prosecutions have been 
anything but swift or certain, and this is with more states participating in 
the Rome Statute regime than Malabo.229 Accordingly, it may be 
worthwhile to consider supplementary monitoring mechanisms that will 
help ensure that, if the Protocol is violated, the prosecutor for the regional 
court will come to learn of these violations. 
Yet, the court might be able to contribute to deterrence in other 
ways. For example, in accordance with the Malabo Protocol, the penalties 
should be adequately publicized regionally to further deterrence.230 The 
regional court should make every effort to publicize its sanctions not just 
                                                     
 227 See id. 
 228 See Part II. 
 229 There are 123 countries that are State parties to the Rome Statute. African States form the biggest 
regional block, with thirty-three state parties. Compare The State Parties to the Rome Statute, 
INT’L CRIMINAL CT., https://asp.icc-
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 230 See Malabo Protocol, supra note 2, art. 43A(3). 
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before the accused or by word of mouth, but in print, online, and on social 
media. Moreover, the court may further deterrence through the severity of 
its penalties and sentences for trafficking in hazardous waste. It remains 
to be seen how the regional court will determine its sentences or penalties 
and whether it will have any impact on marginal deterrence. Because the 
court has a lot of latitude under the Protocol to impose penalties and 
sentences (short of the death penalty),231 significant penalties and 
sentences should be imposed to further the goals of specific and general 
deterrence. 
Additionally, some commentators have found that deterrence due 
to the fear of trials may be more influential for higher-level perpetrators, 
while deterrence due to the fear of penalties might be more impactful for 
lower-level perpetrators.232 It is not evident whether the unlikely, but more 
severe punishment of imprisonment or the more likely, but less severe 
sanction of a fine will deter would-be traffickers in hazardous waste. The 
Malabo Protocol gives the Court the flexibility of taking individual 
circumstances into account when imposing sentences or penalties and 
calibrating sentences accordingly.233 This adaptability will be incredibly 
important for dealing with hazardous waste brokers, as the penalties or 
sentences imposed on these intermediaries may need to differ from those 
imposed on those lower or higher-up the “food-chain.” Unlike retributive 
justice, deterrence theory does not require the punishment of all equally 
culpable individuals. Accordingly, the Court’s inability to prosecute 
political leaders that are alleged to have engaged in trafficking of 
hazardous waste due to the immunity provision is not fatal from a 
deterrence perspective. If exemplary punishments adequately deter future 
crime, that is sufficient. As such, the selective prosecution of 
“intermediaries” or lower level perpetrators may suffice to further general 
deterrence goals. The regional court could focus its prosecutions on private 
local companies, individuals, lower-level government officials and waste 
brokers regionally. This prosecution strategy may be the more feasible 
route in the short term because it will be difficult for the court to obtain 
jurisdiction over higher-level perpetrators or individuals and entities 
outside the continent. Yet, as the regional court grows and begins to 
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increase its credibility, prosecutions of those higher up the food chain 
could be done more fruitfully. 
The court may also further deterrence because this theory of 
punishment depends on the perpetrator being a “rational actor.” The 
individual(s) contemplating engaging in trafficking must be deterrable, 
and trafficking in hazardous waste is a crime that requires careful planning 
as opposed to being a crime of hate or passion. Consequently, deterrence 
theory is expected to work as applied to trafficking in hazardous waste 
because actors engaging in it are more likely to do a cost-benefit analysis. 
Indeed, the combination of cheap land and labor for landfill operations, 
concomitant with looser regulations and enforcement mechanisms in 
developing countries, means that exporting hazardous waste is a cost-
effective option for producers in the Global North, and offers short-term 
benefits to importers in the Global South.234 The Malabo Protocol seeks to 
disrupt this cost-benefit calculus from the reported “$2.50 per ton to 
[legally] dump hazardous waste in Africa as opposed to $250 per ton in 
Europe.”235 
In addition, actors maybe deterred from toxic dumping for non-
legal reasons. For example, lower-level perpetrators might simply believe 
that trafficking in hazardous waste is wrong, or higher-level perpetrators 
may be more concerned about political isolation regionally or 
internationally. For these individuals, the regional court’s intervention 
would be expected to have no impact on deterrence. Yet, the net result of 
these non-legal deterrents would be to reduce the amount of trafficking in 
hazardous waste. Even if it does so minimally, the regional court will 
further deterrence goals by raising the cost of trafficking in hazardous 
waste in Africa—by increasing the regulation and prosecution of this 
crime, or at least increasing the stigma associated with the crime. Thus, 
Article 28L of the Malabo Protocol could assist with fulfilling the Bamako 
Convention’s requirement that criminal penalties “be sufficiently high to 
both punish and deter” trafficking in hazardous waste.236 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Given the analysis above, there are many reasons to be cautiously 
optimistic about Article 28L’s criminalization of trafficking in hazardous 
waste and the provision of a regional forum for the prosecution of 
trafficking in hazardous waste through Malabo. While it may be unlikely 
that regional criminalization and prosecution of toxic dumping will 
contribute to retribution, there are many theories of punishment that 
support the Malabo Protocol’s innovation in this area. These include 
restorative justice, expressive condemnation, and deterrence. It is also 
important to bear in mind that the proposed regional criminal court is one 
tool amongst many for combatting the trafficking in hazardous waste. 
While by no means perfect, the Malabo Protocol potentially presents 
another avenue for African states whose domestic judiciaries and related 
institutions may not be able to prosecute trafficking in hazardous waste at 
all. Additionally, Article 28L of the Protocol, if implemented properly 
certainly helps to fulfill the Bamako Convention’s objectives of 
progressively closing the global impunity gap for dirty dumping in Africa. 
 
